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1962/11/16

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

(307)

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Action

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FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 571, NOVEMBER 16, 9 PM

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BIA3

EXCISE

with corrected
p.3 (copy #2)ACTION DEPARTMENT POLTO 571, INFORMATION LONDON POLTO 99,
MOSCOW POLTO 10, BONN POLTO 80, BERLIN POLTO UNNUMBERED.

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ON NUCLEAR TESTS, KHRUSHCHEV SAID HIS SCIENTISTS INSISTED TESTING NEW SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND THEREFORE SOVIET TESTS COULD NOT BE COMPLETED BY NOV 20 BUT WOULD PROBABLY END EARLY DECEMBER AND CERTAINLY BEFORE END OF YEAR. NO MORE BIG WEAPONS WOULD BE TESTED. WITH CONCLUSION THIS SERIES SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS TEST NEEDS WOULD BE MET AS HE PRESUMED US AND UK NEEDS WOULD ALSO BE MET. AGREEMENT COULD THEN BE REACHED ON TEST BAN. SAID "BLACK BOX" CONCEPT ACCEPTABLE TO SOVIETS WITH INTERNATIONAL CORPS INSPECTORS TO SUPERVISE THEIR INSTALLATION AND WORKING. BLACK BOXES AND INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORS COULD BE FLOWN IN IN SOVIET AIRCRAFT WITH CERTAIN PRECAUTIONS DURING FLIGHT. KHRUSHCHEV OBSERVED THIS SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF VERIFICATION UNDERGROUND TEST BAN SHOULD HELP US CONGRESS AGREE TO COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY.

ON CUBA, KHRUSHCHEV SPOKE OF SOLUTION WORKED OUT AS FAIR

TO 50TH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CRC/MB

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IS/FPO/CDR

Date: *April 9, 1992*

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... FOLIO 571, NOVEMBER 16, 9 PM FROM PARIS

1 BOTH SIDES.

ALL SOVIET ROCKETS AND NUCLEAR WARHEADS HAD BEEN REMOVED AND IT WAS NOW UP TO US TO CARRY OUT ITS SHARE OF BARGAIN BY LIFTING QUARANTINE AND RESPECTING CUBAN SOVEREIGNTY. APPROPRIATE AGREEMENT TO THIS END SHOULD BE CONCLUDED UNDER UNITED NATIONS AUTHORITY. SOVIET TECHNICIANS ARE NOW STILL IN CUBA BUT WOULD LEAVE IN DUE COURSE SINCE SOVIETS WANT NO FOREIGN BASES. KHRUSHCHEV REPORTEDLY REFERRED TO CUBAN INCIDENT AS COMPROMISE AND GOOD EXAMPLE OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. TO QUESTION ABOUT IL-28'S, KHRUSHCHEV REPLIED DEPRECATING THEIR IMPORTANCE AND STATING THEY WERE OBSOLESCENT AND WERE ABOUT TO BE SCRAPPED WHEN AS COUNTER TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S CALL UP OF 15,000 RESERVISTS SOVIET MARSHALS SUGGESTED THEY BE SENT TO CUBA. HE AGAIN CONFIRMED ALL NUCLEAR WARHEADS HAD BEEN REMOVED.

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IN BRIEF DISCUSSION FOLLOWING [] BRIEFING, NORWEGIAN PERMREP OBSERVED KHRUSHCHEV'S SUGGESTION REGARDING UN FLAG AND FUNCTION IN BERLIN WAS INTERESTING WEST HAD FOUGHT KOREAN WAR UNDER UN FLAG AND THUS THIS APPROACH MIGHT PRESERVE ESSENTIALS SINCE IT WOULD ENABLE CONTINUED STATIONING WESTERN TROOPS IN BERLIN. FRENCH PERM REP POINTED OUT QUESTION WHETHER WESTERN TROOPS REMAIN FOR LIMITED OR UNLIMITED PERIOD A VERY IMPORTANT ONE. FUNDAMENTAL SOVIET OBJECTIVE IS CHANGE STATUS THREE POWER TROOPS AND ARRANGEMENT SUGGESTED BY KHRUSHCHEV WOULD BE CHANGE OF STATUS FROM WHICH ENORMOUS CONSEQUENCES WOULD FLOW. PUT BLUNTLY, HE THOUGHT SOVIETS WERE TRYING TO HOODWINK US. HE SAID THAT FRENCH HAD HEARD SOMETHING OF [] INTERVIEW IN OTHER CHANNELS AND THAT VIEW OF QUAI WAS THAT THIS KHRUSHCHEV SUGGESTION REGARDING UN FLAG FOR WESTERN TROOPS IN BERLIN WAS PROBABLY VERY SUGGESTION KHRUSHCHEV HAD INTENDED TO SUBMIT TO UN WHEN HE ARRIVED THERE AFTER SUCCESSFULLY INSTALLING SOVIET ROCKETS IN CUBA. HE COMMENTED ALSO ON PERSONAL BASIS THAT KHRUSHCHEV REMARKS RE CUBA APPEARED TO BE TRYING TO GIVE IMPRESSION THERE WAS

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CONTROL: 6088
CORRECTION ISSUED:
11/18/62 3:15 AM UMT

-3- POLTO 571, NOVEMBER 16, 9 PM FROM PARIS - CORRECTED PAGE 3

NO WINNER OR LOSER IN CUBA AND THAT AN EVEN COMPROMISE
HAD BEEN REACHED. THIS WAS CONTRARY TO FACT THAT US WON A
MAJOR VICTORY EVEN THOUGH QUITE RIGHTLY UNITED STATES
HAD NOT INSISTED PUBLICLY ON FORCING SOVIETS TO ACKNOWLEDGE
DEFEAT.

BELGIAN REMARKED KHRUSHCHEV SEEMED BE MAKING SAME PROPOSALS
HE DID TO SPAAK LAST YEAR. WHEN DUTCH QUESTIONED THIS
INTERPRETATION, BELGIAN REPLIED HE WAS REFERRING SPECIFICALLY
TO KHRUSHCHEV SUGGESTION THAT MIGHT SIGN A SINGLE TREATY
OR TWO TREATIES WITH SPECIAL CLAUSES WHICH SEEMED SIMILAR
TO PROPOSALS MADE TO SPAAK. (COMMENT: EXCEPT FOR MENTIONING
KHRUSHCHEV DESIRE SIGN SINGLE TREATY, [] DID NOT
MENTION OTHER ASPECTS, WHICH BELGIAN READ INTO HIS REMARKS).

CANADIAN STATED SAW TWO THINGS IN [] REPORT: (1) HOW
CLOSE WE WERE TO WAR AND (2) PERHAPS QUESTION OF
"BLACK BOXES" BEING INSTALLED BY INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORS
SHOULD BE STUDIED, SINCE THIS IS NEW, ALTHOUGH HE CONCEDED
THIS MIGHT SIMPLY BE LATEST KHRUSHCHEV EFFORT WHET OUR
APPETITE FOR TEST BAN.

FINLETTER

KEA

NOTE: Handled as LD/SS per SS-0

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